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DOCTRINAL REDUNDANCY AND THE TWO 
PARADOXES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Robin J. Effron* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The quandaries in modern American personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
are myriad.  The overarching question, “why is personal jurisdiction doctrine 
such a mess?” has been a guarantor of full employment for civil procedure 
professors for decades,1 and the subsidiary questions are also well worn.  
What is the relationship between personal jurisdiction and constitutional due 
process?2  What is the relationship between personal jurisdiction and venue?3  
Between personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens?4  Between 
personal jurisdiction and notice?5  Why has the federal government chosen 
via Rule 4(k) to rely heavily on the states for the content of the scope of 
personal jurisdiction? 
A broader question lies at the heart of many of these inquiries:  what is 
personal jurisdiction for, and are we asking personal jurisdiction to do the 
work that either is or should be done by other doctrines?  Stated differently, 
one might ask: is personal jurisdiction redundant of other procedural 
doctrines?  Or are other doctrines redundant of personal jurisdiction?  
Professor Ingrid Wuerth’s Article, The Due Process and Other 
Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations (“Constitutional Rights of Foreign 
Nations”),6 offers the opportunity to focus on an important but often 
overlooked side of personal jurisdiction redundancy, that is, the extent to 
which constitutional personal jurisdiction does (or does not) occupy some 
common space with doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to Michael Cooper for excellent research 
assistance and to Dean Michael Cahill for support from the Dean’s Summer Research Fund. 
 
 1. See Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1403 n.2 (2018) (citing the major personal jurisdiction articles over the 
past few decades). 
 2. See generally Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 
46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071 (1994). 
 3. See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 1463 (2019). 
 4. See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2017). 
 5. See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23 (2018). 
 6. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019). 
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Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations is an important and 
comprehensive contribution to the civil procedure and foreign relations law 
literatures.  With regard to procedure, it advances the debate about personal 
jurisdiction and due process along two key axes.  First, it documents the 
extent to which foreign states have been excluded from the protections of the 
due process rights to resist the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Professor 
Wuerth then constructs an elegant argument for including foreign states as 
the subjects of personal jurisdiction due process protection under the U.S. 
Constitution and then uses that reasoning to make larger points about the 
relationship between personal jurisdiction as a due process protection and 
personal jurisdiction’s role in Article III’s allocation of power to the federal 
courts.  Professor Wuerth highlights personal jurisdiction7 as a core site of 
judicial attention to the due process status of foreign states under the U.S. 
Constitution, and she rightly argues that 
[a]s foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises expand their 
commercial activities and engage with the United States in new ways, 
especially in the cyber, terrorism, and economic-espionage contexts, 
litigation against them is increasing in scope and importance.  Questions 
about their constitutional status, which to date have been litigated mostly 
in the context of personal jurisdiction, are likely to assume greater 
significance in many additional contexts, including in criminal 
prosecutions of corporations owned by foreign states.8   
This is an important observation.  Much of the attention paid to the 
transnational complications in personal jurisdiction has centered around the 
problem of non-resident alien defendants whose due process protections have 
been strengthened to the point that American litigants have trouble suing such 
defendants in a convenient forum state or in any American forum at all,9 a 
problem that I have called the “non-resident alien paradox.”10  Far less 
attention has been given to the equally paradoxical result that when the non-
resident alien defendant is a foreign state, the due process protections for 
personal jurisdiction fall to zero.11  In this brief Essay, I argue that both 
paradoxes share a conceptual origin: the problem of redundancy in 
constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine.  To do so, I highlight the parallel 
stories of personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity that Professor 
Wuerth weaves throughout her Article.  Considering these two stories in the 
same space gives further evidence of the extent to which personal jurisdiction 
overlaps with other procedural doctrines.  But it also shows how the peculiar 
 
 7. Professor Wuerth also addresses the associated notice doctrines. Id. at 668 (“Notice 
was often described as a fundamental aspect of ‘judicial’ power.”). 
 8. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 636. 
 9. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1205 (2018). 
 10. Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2018). 
 11. See Wuerth, supra note 6, at 647 (criticizing recent doctrine as requiring “courts to 
draw a constitutional distinction between foreign corporations and foreign states”). 
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historical path of each doctrine can mask the extent of the shared space and 
thus delay a reckoning with the extent and consequences of the overlap. 
One problem with personal jurisdiction redundancy is the extent to which 
courts have stubbornly refused to acknowledge much of the overlap or take 
seriously the implications of redundancy.12  This lack of engagement is partly 
responsible for the double paradox of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction 
where private alien defendants seem to enjoy greater constitutional 
protections than domestic defendants, while their sovereign counterparts are 
granted the least of them all.13  My thesis here is not mutually exclusive with 
the many other theories and explanations of the scope and provenance of 
constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine.  But there is a particular 
doctrinal history to tell here.  By the time that personal jurisdiction had come 
to occupy some serious shared space with several other procedural doctrines, 
the lack of engagement both furthered the detachment of the doctrines and 
solidified much of the redundancy. 
At several junctures, scholars have wondered what constitutional personal 
jurisdiction doctrine can and should add to procedural doctrines that regulate 
access to courts and parties’ amenability to suit in U.S. jurisdictions, and 
procedural doctrines that sort lawsuits into geographically suitable or 
appropriate locations.  Professor Wuerth’s Article invites us to refocus on the 
question of what doctrines can and should regulate the amenability of foreign 
sovereigns (as well as the agencies and instrumentalities of foreign 
sovereigns) to suit in American courts. 
I.  THE ORIGINS OF REDUNDANCY IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
In the first century of the republic, personal jurisdiction was largely an 
affair of state law, with its origins in natural law, the “general law,” and 
international law principles of comity.14  The federal constitutional 
dimensions of personal jurisdiction were limited to questions of full faith and 
credit and other structural federalism concerns.15  The affirmative 
requirements for personal jurisdiction came in the form of state statutory and 
common law rules for service of process—this was how personal jurisdiction 
 
 12. There are in fact ways in which personal jurisdiction redundancy may be problematic 
on its own terms, but I decline to take up that larger issue in this short Essay. 
 13. Cf. Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 325, 
372 (2018) (“[I]t makes little sense to draw dramatic distinctions between sovereigns and 
private parties when the entire structure of the FSIA is premised upon the principle that, when 
sovereigns act like private parties, they will be treated like private parties.”). 
 14. See Wuerth, supra note 6, at 668; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 
TEX L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2017) (arguing against “the main holding of Pennoyer: that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . imposes rules for personal jurisdiction”); 
Effron, supra note 5, at 30 (2018) (observing that, prior to Pennoyer, courts approached 
personal jurisdiction primarily as a limit on a court’s authority—one grounded “first and 
foremost in notions of territoriality”). 
 15. See Effron, supra note 5, at 30; Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850–84 (1989). 
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was “perfected” and it also served the purpose for fulfilling the natural and 
general law requirements of notice of the pendency of an action.16  The law 
of service of process served multiple purposes, but it would be a stretch to 
say that personal jurisdiction itself was redundant of other procedural 
doctrines, at least not in any significant way. 
It was not until Pennoyer v. Neff17 that personal jurisdiction became a 
doctrine, national in scope, that was meant to “do” something, although the 
identity of that “thing” was unclear at the time of Pennoyer and remains the 
subject of intense debate through the modern era.  In Pennoyer, the Supreme 
Court held that impermissible exercises of personal jurisdiction by state 
courts were in fact due process violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.18  
Here was born the personal jurisdiction redundancy problem:  if personal 
jurisdiction was, in fact, a feature of constitutional due process, what is the 
“process” in personal jurisdiction that is due to the defendant?  By the end of 
nearly 150 years of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
was struggling to articulate what personal jurisdiction itself had to offer 
beyond the constitutional enforcement of the territorial limitations of the 
power of a forum state.19 
Although the due process question is ostensibly connected to a standard of 
“reasonableness,”20 the attempt to define what sort of exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is constitutionally unreasonable has not produced anything 
approaching a clear or workable standard.  One reason for this is that courts 
and commentators have had some difficulty in answering the due process 
nexus question in a manner that is not duplicative of other procedural 
doctrines, both constitutional and rule-based.  Once personal jurisdiction 
became “A Thing” under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts needed to know 
what it was “for” in order to locate or justify the due process violation. 
Although one can identify Pennoyer as the conceptual origin of personal 
jurisdiction redundancy, this puzzle remained relatively submerged until the 
Supreme Court announced the minimum contacts test as the due process 
standard for personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.21  
The Pennoyer rule required personal, in-hand service of process, mostly 
within the territory of the forum state.22  Efforts to push the boundaries of the 
 
 16. See Effron, supra note 5, at 30–31. 
 17. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 18. Id. at 733. 
 19. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
 20. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985); see also Wendy 
Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and 
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 510–18 (examining and questioning the link 
between due process and several putative interests addressed by personal jurisdiction 
doctrine). 
 21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 22. See RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:  A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 207–61 (2004) (history and status of due process doctrine for 
personal jurisdiction). 
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Pennoyer rule with substituted service or service outside the territory of the 
forum state centered around cases that seemed to fit within Pennoyer’s 
exceptions, such as in rem proceedings,23 or efforts to expand the 
jurisdictional reach of states with aggressive uses of explicit and implied 
consent to suit in the forum state.24  But, for the most part, the pre-
International Shoe cases maintained the Pennoyer framework, which was 
largely consistent with the older general law and comity framework with the 
additional veneer of due process as the doctrinal hook for the idea of a 
constitutionally based outer limit on the exercise of jurisdiction. 
The International Shoe minimum contacts standard opened up a world of 
long-arm jurisdiction possibilities.  The minimum contacts test itself was 
borne of frustration with trying to discern the territorial “presence” of an 
ever-increasing number of non-natural defendants (mainly corporations), 
transacting business and engaging in other actions within and across any 
number of jurisdictions beyond their state of organization or primary 
business operations.  The minimum contacts test freed courts from the rigid 
and often artificial territoriality of Pennoyer.  But it generated a new set of 
questions about the constitutional grounding of personal jurisdiction. 
In the seven decades since the Court announced the minimum contacts test, 
various theories of personal jurisdiction and its relationship to minimum 
contacts and due process have gone in and out of vogue.25  Among the many 
criticisms of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are the claims 
that personal jurisdiction in general and the minimum contacts test in 
particular are duplicative of other procedural doctrines or procedural tools—
procedural devices that are, perhaps, better suited to addressing the various 
concerns that courts and commentators have voiced.  The rules of venue and 
doctrine of forum non conveniens are tools to sort cases into geographically 
sensical forums.26  The rules of service of process and constitutional 
dimensions of notice address the concerns of how and when to reach the 
defendant and inform it of the pendency of a lawsuit.27  Underlying 
substantive law can or should be constructed and interpreted so as not to 
 
 23. See Effron, supra note 5, at 36–47 (analyzing the following exceptions to the rigid 
Pennoyer regime: in rem cases, cases involving marital status, cases involving service of 
process on state officials in their capacity as agents for corporations, cases involving consent 
to a forum state’s jurisdiction, and in personam out-of-state service, i.e. when a resident of a 
state is served with process to appear in their home state while they are currently out of state). 
 24. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927). 
 25. See Effron, supra note 5, at 35 n.36 (collecting scholarly articles on the history and 
theories of personal jurisdiction). 
 26. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman?:  Forum 
Shopping and Outcome Determination under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 
841 (1995) (“Rather than having venue become increasingly reliant on jurisdiction doctrine, a 
more sensible approach might be for the jurisdictional rules to mirror the federal venue statute, 
or the state law equivalents.”); John T. Parry, Introduction:  Due Process, Borders, and the 
Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 827, 855 (2012). 
 27. See Effron, supra note 5, at 31, 38. 
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surprise a defendant that it is subject to suit in a forum state.28  Or, substantive 
contract law is an able vehicle for determining the effect of a forum selection 
clause.29 
This redundancy has further complicated the project of discerning the 
purposes and scope of constitutional personal jurisdiction, but it has also 
muddied the waters of some of the other doctrines mentioned above.  
Perhaps, for example, it is forum non conveniens that is in need of rethinking, 
and not (only) personal jurisdiction.30  The overall effect, though, is worth 
noting.  The redundancy of constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine 
creates somewhat of a ping pong effect in which critics of one doctrine can 
point to the existence of the other in order to promote the demise of the 
disfavored doctrine.  For example, it is reasonable to critique either forum 
non conveniens doctrine or personal jurisdiction doctrine for failing to 
properly or consistently allocate cases fairly or efficiently to different 
geographical forums.  But shoring up those arguments by pointing to the 
other doctrine as “backup” has had the odd effect of bolstering the existence 
of both. 
II.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINES 
This brings us to an important thread woven throughout Professor 
Wuerth’s Article, a story that deserves special attention.  Running alongside 
Professor Wuerth’s elegant description of and argument about the 
constitutional status of foreign sovereigns as viewed through the lens of 
personal jurisdiction and due process, is the story of foreign sovereign 
immunity.  As other scholars have already noted, the current law governing 
foreign sovereign immunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA), “muddles the traditional ways one thinks about subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and immunity.”31 
 
 28. Cf. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
101, 153 (2010) (criticizing the personal jurisdiction “notice of suit” theory as circular because 
of its dependence on the existence of jurisdiction in the first place and its relationship to the 
underlying substantive law). 
 29. The Supreme Court has increasingly favored a federal, procedural approach to the 
enforceability of forum selection clauses rather than a searching look at whether underlying 
state contract law would permit such enforcement. See generally Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic 
Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 795 (2015) (arguing that, despite Supreme 
Court support for the enforcement of forum selection clauses, federal courts should defer to 
state law on this issue). 
 30. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 429 (suggesting that forum non conveniens is redundant 
with several existing doctrines including personal jurisdiction). 
 31. Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments and Awards:  What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 369 (2016); 
see also Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 
85, 120–22 (1983) (discussing the relationship between subject matter jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction, and foreign sovereign immunity). 
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The question of whether and when foreign states (and their associated 
subdivisions or instrumentalities) are immune from suit in American courts 
has a history as long as that of personal jurisdiction.  But because of the early 
structure and scope of each doctrine, the potential for overlap simply did not 
manifest itself until the modern era.  I will return to the implications of this 
redundancy in Part III.  What follows here is a brief outline of how foreign 
sovereign immunity has interacted and then overlapped with issues of 
jurisdiction.32 
Sovereign immunity is actually a collection of doctrines that govern when 
a litigant can bring an action against a government, or a governmental agency 
or instrumentality.33  In the United States, the sovereign immunity of 
domestic sovereigns is governed by the U.S. Constitution and assorted 
statutes that waive immunity.34  The immunity of foreign sovereigns from 
suit is not governed by the Constitution.35  This absence, however, does not 
imply that foreign sovereign immunity is a new or exceptional doctrine.  At 
the time of the founding, the litigation immunity of foreign sovereigns was 
well-recognized.  Courts operated under the presumption that sovereign 
immunity applied unless the lawsuit fell into one of the established 
exceptions, such as consent.36 
During the time period that roughly corresponds to the pre-Pennoyer era 
through International Shoe, the sovereign immunity of foreign states meant 
“absolute immunity.”  Under absolute immunity, foreign governments that 
the U.S. deemed “friendly sovereigns” were granted the same absolute 
immunity as domestic sovereigns, and the executive branch, through the 
State Department, requested immunity in all actions against friendly 
sovereigns.37  Like the early personal jurisdiction doctrines, absolute 
immunity was grounded, in part, in international law principles of comity.  
Absolute immunity, which was fairly categorical and largely controlled by 
the executive branch, kept excessive litigation over the scope of foreign 
sovereign immunity at a relatively low level.  Recall that the pre-Pennoyer 
 
 32. Much of this history is covered throughout Professor Wuerth’s Article.  My goal here 
is to draw out this story for special consideration on its own terms. 
 33. Foreign sovereign immunity actually concerns both when foreign states are subject to 
suit and when actions to enforce judgments can be brought against them.  For purposes of this 
Essay, I refer generally to immunity from suit. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8–12 (McKinney 2019) 
(waiving immunity and consenting to be sued pursuant to the requirements of the N.Y. Court 
of Claims Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(1) (West 2017) (waiving immunity for government 
entities in certain situations). 
 35. Sovereign immunity is currently governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 
1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012)). 
 36. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 125 (1812) (noting 
that in areas where “sovereignty is concerned,” there is no implied assent to a foreign court’s 
jurisdiction). 
 37. 15A Martin A. Redish, Moore’s Federal Practice § 104.02 (2019); Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (noting that, until 1952, the Executive Branch followed 
a policy of requesting immunity in all actions against foreign sovereigns). 
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and Pennoyer regimes of personal jurisdiction had a similar effect—litigation 
about the scope of constitutional personal jurisdiction coalesced around the 
Pennoyer exceptions. 
Thus, these two forces converged to minimize litigation of the larger 
questions concerning the scope of foreign sovereign immunity.  Territorially 
centered bases of personal jurisdiction (both pre- and post-Pennoyer), would 
have seriously limited the number of cases that plaintiffs on American soil 
attempted to bring against foreign sovereigns and governments.  Combined 
with the doctrine of absolute immunity, this legal landscape meant that courts 
did not confront these questions with the regularity that we have come to 
experience in the modern era. 
Just as personal jurisdiction changed significantly in the mid-twentieth 
century, so did foreign sovereign immunity.  The legal, economic, and social 
conditions that led to these changes have been well-documented.  In short, 
by the end of World War II, the United States was a modern, interconnected 
economy in which parties conducted more and more business and other 
activities at a distance and across state and international borders.  A strict 
territorial jurisdictional regime proved frustrating, resulting in the twin due 
process revolutions of International Shoe, which established minimum 
contacts as the constitutional test for in personam jurisdiction, and Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,38 which governed the due process 
standard for notice.  These cases significantly broadened a forum state’s 
ability to assert personal jurisdiction over absent defendants, particularly 
with regard to non-natural persons whose physical “presence” within a forum 
was difficult to articulate. 
Foreign sovereign immunity doctrine was also in need of reform because 
the theory of absolute immunity was becoming difficult to reconcile with the 
myriad ways in which foreign states and state-owned enterprises engaged in 
widespread commercial activity.  In 1952, the State Department issued the 
“Tate Letter,” in which it informed the Attorney General that the State 
Department, in deciding whether to advise in favor of or against a grant of 
sovereign immunity, would abandon the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity in favor of the “restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,” under 
which “the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign 
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts 
(jure gestionis).”39  This shift aligned the United States with several other 
nations that had already adopted the restrictive theory.  As the Second Circuit 
succinctly asserted: 
[t]he purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is to try to 
accommodate the interest of individuals doing business with foreign 
governments in having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the 
 
 38. 339 U.S. 306. 
 39. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 984–85 (1952). 
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interest of foreign governments in being free to perform certain political 
acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the 
propriety of such acts before foreign courts.40 
These mid-century changes, then, are of a piece, characterized by a 
recognition that the older, more rigid rules did not accord with modern 
economic reality.  This new era of procedural due process and of restrictive 
sovereign immunity brought neither closure nor clarity to these doctrines.  
Within just a few years of International Shoe, the Supreme Court began its 
decades-long odyssey to define the scope and theoretical basis for the 
minimum contacts test and its relationship to due process.41  Restrictive 
sovereign immunity, for its part, was similarly volatile.  The State 
Department purported to make its decisions of immunity recommendations 
based on the substantive criteria of restrictive immunity.  In reality, however, 
many decisions continued to be politically motivated.42  Although the 
purpose of the new approach was to accommodate the changing economic 
 
 40. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 41. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) 
(holding that a defendant must have sufficient contact with the forum state in connection with 
the claim at bar for jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (holding that 
a subsidiary’s minimum contacts with a forum cannot be imputed to the parent company to 
obtain jurisdiction); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (holding that 
the defendant must intend, through its actions, to submit to the power of the sovereign for 
jurisdiction to be proper); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
919 (2011) (holding that a parent company’s minimum contacts with a forum state cannot by 
imputed to a subsidiary for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction and that, for a court to have 
general jurisdiction over a company, it must be “essentially at home in the forum State.”); 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that placing an 
item into the “stream of commerce” alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction); Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (holding that a contract alone was insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction, one must look at the circumstances holistically and determine the 
defendant purposefully targeted the forum); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 
(1984) (holding that, because the plaintiff was injured every time a magazine was sold, 
jurisdiction was proper in all forums where the magazine was available); Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that intent to cause harm in the forum state is sufficient to grant 
jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that 
foreseeability of litigation in a forum state is insufficient without other contacts and 
introducing “fairness factors” for help in determining whether jurisdiction would be proper); 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that the minimum contacts test also applies 
to in rem actions); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that a plaintiff’s unilateral 
action is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a defendant); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 
U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that one contact can be sufficient for personal jurisdiction depending 
on the circumstances). 
 42. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (the application of 
the restrictive theory “proved troublesome”); see also Clinton L. Narver, Putting the 
“Sovereign” Back in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:  The Case for a Time of Filing 
Test for Agency or Instrumentality Status, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 169 (2001) (over time, “the 
State Department’s policy of making formal suggestions of immunity transformed the foreign 
sovereign immunity determination from a predominantly ‘legal’ determination into a 
predominantly ‘political’ determination wherein the Executive determined the rights of 
plaintiffs and foreign states alike on a case-by-case basis”). 
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and legal realities of the twentieth century, restrictive immunity proved 
unwieldy.43 
The difficulties in administering and adjudicating restrictive immunity 
culminated in the FSIA.  Like the history of personal jurisdiction, the FSIA 
has been the subject of exhaustive scholarly consideration.44  In brief, the aim 
of the FSIA was to shift the process of determining foreign sovereign 
immunity to the federal courts,45 thus depoliticizing such decision-making,46 
but codifying “for the most part . . . the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity.”47  The FSIA codified the main exceptions to foreign sovereign 
immunity:  express and implied waiver,48 substantial commercial activity 
that is either conducted in or causes a direct effect in the United States,49 and 
an assortment of other exceptions including noncommercial torts, unlawful 
expropriation, and arbitration agreements.50 
Since its passage in 1976, the FSIA has been amended and interpreted in 
a way that, in effect, narrows immunity and broadens the scope of claims for 
which foreign states (and their agencies and instrumentalities) are subject to 
suit.51  This narrowing of foreign sovereign immunity coincides with the late-
twentieth-century era of personal jurisdiction in which the Supreme Court 
has, for the most part, developed an increasingly narrow approach to the 
scope of minimum contacts.  This leads to the potentially troubling result that 
Professor Wuerth identifies in her Article:  at the time when foreign states 
are the least protected by foreign sovereign immunity, they are left in a 
personal jurisdiction lurch because of the series of cases in which the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have held that foreign states are not persons 
within the meaning of the due process clauses for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction.52  This is not to suggest that the default norm should be that of 
protecting foreign sovereigns from suit.  It does, however, raise troubling 
 
 43. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—a Proposal for Reform of 
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901, 909–12 (1969). 
 44. See generally Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: 
The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 369 (2001); William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257 (1997); Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a 
“Person”?  Does it Matter?:  Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 119–29 (2001); Robert B. von Mehren, The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (1978). 
 45. The FSIA also has a subject matter jurisdiction component, codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1330. 
 46. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 685 (1981) (“The principal purpose of 
the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity 
and withdraw from the President the authority to make binding determinations of the sovereign 
immunity to be accorded foreign states.”). 
 47. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2019). 
 49. Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 50. Id. § 1605(a)(5), (6). 
 51. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 640. 
 52. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 648–49. 
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questions when foreign states, as a category, seem excluded from the baseline 
protections enjoyed by domestic and non-state foreign defendants alike. 
III.  FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION REDUNDANCY 
Professor Wuerth identifies the primary contemporary reason for the 
exclusion of foreign states from the due process protections of personal 
jurisdiction, namely, that courts have refused to define foreign states as 
persons within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.  The FSIA itself has a complicated relationship to both 
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.53  Although it governs 
when a foreign state is amenable to suit, personal jurisdiction must be 
established separately.  The FSIA cannot create personal jurisdiction where 
it does not exist constitutionally.  Her historical and doctrinal arguments that 
this conclusion is erroneous are thorough and provocative, particularly her 
argument that the structure and early understanding of the scope of judicial 
power under Article III of the Constitution extends to in personam 
jurisdictional power over foreign sovereigns.  In this Essay, however, I want 
to highlight the role that personal jurisdiction redundancy plays in this story. 
The ways in which personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity 
are redundant of one another should, by now, be obvious.  Each doctrine 
implicates, at some level, due process (or the lack thereof) and separation of 
powers.54  Each doctrine addresses, at least in part, restrictions on the 
amenability of a party to the jurisdiction of a territorial sovereign.  Each 
doctrine has a historical tradition of allowing the party to consent.  And, in 
each doctrine, courts and legislators have struggled to accommodate the 
competing considerations of modern commercial realities with limits of state 
territorial power.  In fact, as one commentator has noted, the FSIA “nexus 
requirement usually ensures that assertions of personal jurisdiction under the 
FSIA satisfy due process requirements.”55 
But, over the past four decades, consideration of each doctrine has been 
relatively siloed.  The legislative and judicial expansion of the FSIA 
exceptions unfolded, for the most part, without explicit regard to the “foreign 
state” gap in personal jurisdiction into which many of these defendants would 
fall.  Similarly, one would expect the judicial personal jurisdiction discourse, 
which has become so solicitous of the supposed horrors of territorial 
 
 53. See 15A Martin H. Redish, Moore’s Federal Practice § 104.06 (2019) (“The FSIA 
conflates the usually distinct questions of sovereign immunity, subject matter jurisdiction, and 
personal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 54. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 680 (discussing “[t]he redundancy between separation of 
powers and due process” in the constitutional protection of foreign states). 
 55. Victoria A. Carter, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REV. 357, 363 (1996). 
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overreach, to be especially sensitive to the interests of foreign nations.56  But, 
as we have seen, the opposite has been true. 
I believe that this is due to implicit assumptions that arise from personal 
jurisdiction redundancy.  There might be an unexamined or unstated belief 
that the question of the amenability of foreign states (as well as their agencies 
and instrumentalities) is not “really” a personal jurisdiction question at all, 
but solely a question of foreign sovereign immunity.  This intuition is what 
gets clumsily translated into the argument that foreign states are not persons 
within the meaning of due process.  And, of course, my argument here flies 
in the face of the several cases which hold that personal jurisdiction over 
foreign state defendants is a separate question to be answered after the 
determination that the defendant is not immune from suit under the FSIA.  In 
other words, how could courts and commentators have an intuition that 
foreign sovereign immunity is the “real” limit on the amenability of foreign 
states to be sued in federal court when they simultaneously make explicit 
demands that the requirements of constitutional personal jurisdiction must 
also be fulfilled? 
There is not a satisfactory doctrinal or theoretical answer to this question 
(at least as of now) because the conundrum is born of a lack of clarity in the 
relationship between personal jurisdiction and any number of other doctrines 
including foreign sovereign immunity.  The current gap that Professor 
Wuerth addresses in her Article is yet another example of the “ping pong” 
effect that I described earlier in which efforts to dilute, circumscribe, or 
eradicate one procedural doctrine are justified, at least in part, by reference 
to a different doctrine that should “really” be doing the work of the first.  It 
is easy to cut foreign states out of personal jurisdiction with the vague notion 
that foreign sovereign immunity places appropriate limits on the amenability 
of foreign states to suit.  And it is similarly easy to broaden the exceptions to 
the FSIA when there is solid precedent reminding courts and commentators 
that constitutional personal jurisdiction is a separate requirement. 
Aside from serving as an example of some of the problems that arise from 
redundancy in personal jurisdiction doctrine, there are a few other lessons 
about personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity that can be drawn 
from highlighting the parallel histories.  First, both stories originate as old 
and accepted doctrines that predate the Constitution and have a common 
ancestor in international law principles of comity.  But despite their ancient 
provenance, both doctrines have developed as reactions to actual and 
perceived changes in economic and political realities.  In both doctrines, 
courts have struggled to articulate generally applicable principles that allow 
for the necessary exercise of jurisdictional authority over commercial and 
 
 56. Cf. Simowitz, supra note 13, at 362 (arguing that Congress should have the “power to 
interpret Due Process jurisdiction as it pertains to foreign persons” and that it “should be even 
greater . . . where foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are concerned”). 
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other activities that have some connection to the forum state57 without 
rendering the idea of territorial jurisdiction itself obsolete.  The parallel 
histories show the importance of relative baselines.  By the 1980s, many 
jurists viewed the limits on constitutional personal jurisdiction as too lax and 
laid the doctrinal foundations for the restrictive doctrines that have emerged 
in the post-2011 cases.  But during the same time period, lawmakers and 
judges viewed the FSIA as too restrictive, and sought to relax the restrictions 
on suing foreign states and, especially, their agencies and instrumentalities.  
The background condition of personal jurisdiction redundancy allowed both 
of these doctrinal paths to continue without a real dialogue about their mutual 
effects. 
Second, this juxtaposition is further evidence of the poor fit between 
personal jurisdiction and due process.  If, as Professor Wuerth suggests, 
Congress should take a greater role in defining the due process content of the 
constitutional rights of foreign states,58 then it seems like foreign sovereign 
immunity, as codified in the FSIA, would be a natural place to start.  It is, in 
fact, a comprehensive statute in which Congress has specified when foreign 
states should or should not be amenable to suit in the United States.  A call 
to merge foreign sovereign immunity with constitutional personal 
jurisdiction is consistent with recent scholarship suggesting that the United 
States (rather than the individual states) is the relevant sovereign for cases 
brought in federal courts and that the Fifth Amendment is the relevant due 
process clause.59  As Professor Simowitz has observed, there is a relationship 
between the stubborn commitment to trans-substantivity in civil procedure 
and weak congressional involvement in regulating the scope of personal 
jurisdiction at the federal level, but he also suggests that “Congress has both 
the accountability and the expertise to craft substance specific rules,”60 and 
this would include rules for suing foreign sovereigns. 
Foreign sovereign immunity and the FSIA are emphatically not 
constitutional doctrines.61  If anything, courts typically mention due process 
in the FSIA context only to point out that it is a requirement that must be 
 
 57. Even if that connection is mostly the result of the plaintiff’s residence, see J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (finding that New Jersey state court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over claim brought by New Jersey resident for a workplace injury that 
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defendant”); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (affirming and broadening Hanson’s 
unilateral activity standard). 
 58. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 685; see also Simowitz, supra note 13, at 370. 
 59. See Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 522–
23 (2019) (developing a theory of Fifth Amendment due process protections for personal 
jurisdiction). 
 60. Simowitz, supra note 13, at 380. 
 61. Cf. Lori Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 522–23 
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separately satisfied62 and that the current weight of Supreme Court authority 
demands the conclusion that foreign states are not protected by due process.63  
One possible answer is to stress, as do Professor Wuerth and others, that 
Congress has the power to regulate personal jurisdiction both as a statutory 
matter and as a matter of defining the due process scope of the doctrine. 
Another possible answer to this conundrum is to suggest that courts have 
been misguided in their assertions or assumptions that foreign sovereign 
immunity, if properly codified or applied, is itself not a satisfaction of due 
process.  While it is already true that “the FSIA . . . does not relieve courts of 
the obligation of protecting the due process rights of foreign state 
defendants,”64 the decisions that Congress makes about the amenability of 
foreign states to suit could be viewed as a single answer to multiple questions, 
namely, (1) how has Congress chosen to codify foreign sovereign 
immunity?; (2) how has Congress chosen to affirmatively extend the personal 
jurisdiction authority of the United States as sovereign to foreign states?; and 
(3) how has Congress chosen to interpret the due process limits of personal 
jurisdiction over foreign states?  To the extent that a unitary law addressing 
the amenability of foreign states to suit addresses all three questions, then 
due process is coextensive with foreign sovereign immunity, and it may even 
be possibly to imply this unification in a statute like the FSIA without 
Congress making the explicit connection.65 
Professor Wuerth does not explicitly argue that congressionally codified 
foreign sovereign immunity is or could be coextensive with due process.  
However, her analysis does point in this direction.  While I find this an 
intriguing possibility, I would retreat to the safer territory of asserting that 
this problem simply adds to the numerous arguments for why personal 
jurisdiction should probably be decoupled from due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Personal jurisdiction redundancy is the result of the significant doctrinal 
overlap that I have documented in this brief Essay.  Underlying this overlap 
are serious disagreements about the theories behind personal jurisdiction:  
sovereignty, liberty, territorial control, convenience, and fairness and 
reasonableness to the defendant, plaintiff, or both—not to say anything of the 
role that due process plays and the question of what due process even means.  
The Supreme Court does not appear poised to resolve these debates any time 
 
 62. See, e.g., Tex. Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 
(2d Cir. 1981) (overruled by Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan 
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soon.  It might be possible, in the meantime, to patch a few holes where we 
can, and the gap between non-resident alien defendants, domestic defendants, 
and foreign state defendants might be one such place.  Taking advantage of 
personal jurisdiction redundancy with foreign sovereign immunity might be 
a partial (or temporary) solution, in which a more robust understanding of 
what doctrines count as due process (perhaps a statute like the FSIA) and 
who is entitled to make such a constitutional interpretation (Congress) would 
fill the void of constitutional protection. 
